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REASONS AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
Patrick Lee 
The problem addressed is: whether religious belief, defined here as accepting that God has 
revealed and that what he has revealed is true, could ever be rational. That is, does the idea 
of religious belief imply that it is irrational? The author attempts to resolve this problem in 
favor of religious belief, and suggests how reasons can legitimately function in religious 
belief. The evidentialist objection to religion is answered, and it is proposed that reasons 
might function, not to prove that God has revealed, or that what he has revealed is true, but 
that the choice to believe is a morally responsible one. 
Perhaps the most central philosophical question regarding religion is, whether any 
religious belief could ever be rational? The philosophical question is not, whether 
any religious belief is rational, since to answer that question may require more than 
philosophical inquiry. The question is, does the very idea of religious belief entail 
that persons having it are doing something irrational or epistemically improper? If 
this general question is answered negatively, then one need not inquire into any 
more particular claims on the part of religious belief; religious belief would be, in 
that case, doomed to failure from the start. On the other hand, arriving at a positive 
answer would tell us more than that religious belief could be rational. It would also 
tell us something about how it might be so. That is, it would begin to show what 
the structure of the act of religious belief is, and it would suggest to us what role, 
if any, reasons might have in religious belief. 
i. The General Problem 
Let us be more specific about how the problem whether religious belief could be 
rational arises. Suppose that on a Friday afternoon Professor Jones, a colleague of 
mine in the philosophy department where I teach, tells me that a student named 
Smith came by to see me that morning while I was not in. According to Prof. 
Jones, Smith wanted to tell me that he liked my logic course last semester and 
wanted to talk with me about philosophy. There is no way for me to verify Jones' 
story. I cannot have direct knowledge that what he says is true, since I am not 
perceiving it. Nor can I prove that what he says is true since Smith (let us say) left 
no effect of his having been there. Hence I do not have indirect knowledge of the 
fact either. So, it appears that I have a choice. I could believe Jones or not. If I 
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believe him, then I will be accepting what he says as true (assenting to it), not 
because I can experience or prove it, but on the basis of Jones' trustworthiness. 
This is a somewhat typical act of non-religious belief. Notice that it does not 
appear to be a blind leap of faith. If I know Jones, and he has the signs or marks 
of being an honest and level-headed person, then, it seems, my believing him-
accepting what he says because he says it--could be a reasonable act. It could 
be a reasonable act, even while, in a sense, it would involve something in 
addition to reason: it would involve a trust in Jones and a willingness to rely on 
his word or character for information I could not obtain on my own. 
Of course, this also means that an act of belief could be unreasonable. If I 
know, or should know, that Jones is an inveterate liar, or that he regularly 
hallucinates, or is in some way not trustworthy, then believing him might be 
irrational. Thus, it seems that whether I should believe Jones or not can be 
rationally discussed. It makes sense to ask, "Should I believe Jones?" Further-
more, it seems that if I give reasons for why I should believe Jones, or for why 
it is reasonable to believe him, this is not the same as proving the truth of what 
he says-for in that case it would no longer be a case of believing him. 
This sort of act, often called "belief' or "faith," then, would seem to involve: 
accepting what someone says, not because there is compelling evidence for it 
(in the form of experience, understanding or proof), but on the basis of that 
person's trustworthiness. I Some kinds of faith or belief may involve more than 
this, but it does not seem they would involve less. 2 
Philosophers and theologians in the Catholic tradition have often contrasted 
belief with knowledge on the one hand and opinion on the other. By "knowledge" 
they meant, roughly: holding a proposition to be true on the basis of evidence 
which, when considered, compels one to accept that proposition to be true. The 
evidence, of course, could be of various sorts, for example, experience, under-
standing (as in a self-evident proposition, such as, A whole is greater than its 
parts), or proof. (Of course, there are different interpretations of the various 
categories of evidence, but that is not of direct concern to my topic here.) By 
"having an opinion" they meant, being inclined to accept something as true on 
the basis of evidence, but, the evidence being less than decisive, lacking complete 
certainty about the matter, i.e., fearing the opposite might be true. (By "certainty" 
I mean simply the firmness with which one holds that a proposition is true. It 
seems evident to me that there are varying degrees of such firmness. One uses 
the word "certainty" without qualification, however, to refer to complete cer-
tainty, i. e. , adherence to a proposition with no fear that its opposite may be true.) 
Thus belief, in the sense in which we are using the term here, is like knowledge 
in that one has complete certainty; it is unlike knowledge in that the evidence 
by itself is not compelling-and so there is in belief the element of free choice. 
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Belief is like opinion in that the evidence is less than compelling but unlike opinion 
in that in belief one does have complete certainty. 3 
Religious belief is in many ways analogous to non-religious belief. Christians 
claim that they believe God himself. Christians claim that God has spoken through 
the words and deeds of prophets and of his Son, and that these words and deeds are 
handed down to us by the Church. Religious belief, according to this claim, 
involves accepting what God has communicated (done and spoken), "not because 
its intrinsic truth is seen with the natural light of reason, but because of the author-
ity of God who reveals it, of God who can neither deceive nor be deceived. "4 In 
that sense it is like the example of believing Prof. Jones. However, what God has 
done and spoken is handed down to us by messengers or mediators. For this reason 
it is perhaps more like believing Jones but hearing what he has said through a mes-
senger, say, his secretary (or the secretarial pool). In any case, it appears that, just 
as non-religious belief can be reasonable without being knowledge, similarly, the 
fact that religious belief is belief does not mean that it cannot be reasonable. 
ii. A Puzzle About Accepting the Fact of Revelation 
However, while religious belief is in many respects similar to non-religious 
belief, there is a philosophically (and theologically) important disanalogy. In 
human belief the structure of the act is as follows: I accept a proposition, p, on the 
basis of testimony by a witness. That the witness says p is obvious. What someone 
might doubt, and what seems to require a decision in the case of non-religious 
belief, is: given that this witness says p, is the witness veracious in saying it? That 
is: a) is this person in a position to know the truth of this proposition, and b) is this 
person honest in asserting what that person asserts? 
But with religious belief the situation is reversed. Hardly anyone doubts that 
if God asserts p, then p must be true. Few people will say, "Well, God did say that 
he is triune, but I don't believe it for a moment." What some doubt, and what seems 
to require a choice to accept, is whether God does in fact assert p. Before one 
accepts p, it seems one must first accept that God has asserted p--the fact of 
revelation. 
This situation presents a problem. On what basis does one accept the fact of 
revelation?' On what basis does the believer accept the principal thing which 
non-believers do not accept? It would seem that one's certainty of the fact of 
revelation must be based either on knowledge or on belief, for only these seem 
to give certainty. (T assume here that believers are certain of what they believe.) 
But supposing either leads to problems. 
If one has knowledge of the fact of revelation then, it seems, one's acceptance 
of the revealed truths is not faith but knowledge. If one has knowledge that, a) 
God is truthful (or, more modestly, that if God asserts p then p is true), and b) 
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God has asserted p, then the conclusion that p is true is an instance of knowledge, 
not belief. 
On the other hand, if acceptance of the fact of revelation is based simply on 
testimony, whether human or divine, also, there are problems. By belief one 
normally means: accepting p on someone's testimony. But to accept the fact that 
God is giving testimony on the basis of God's testimony is obviously not rational. 
If one is asked, "Why do you believe so-and-so," and one replies, "Because 
so-and-so himself said he is trustworthy," the reply could scarcely be taken 
seriously. 
Moreover, while some people's acceptance with certainty of the fact of reve-
lation (e.g., that of children and simple, uneducated people) can be rationally 
based on human testimony, this cannot be the case with everyone's acceptance 
of the fact of revelation. The reason is this. For belief to be rational it must 
ultimately be traced back to someone's knowledge of the matter. 6 Now, first, it 
is not at all clear that any human persons have or had knowledge that God has 
in fact given a revelation. Rather, it may be that every human person, prophets 
and apostles included, must accept the fact of revelation by a type of choice, 
and not by knowledge. Hence human testimony could not be the ultimate basis, 
rationally, for one's acceptance of the fact of revelation. Second, the only human 
beings who could plausibly be said to know that God has given a revelation are 
quite far removed from us in time. Therefore, if human testimony were the basis 
of one's certainty about the fact of revelation (setting aside the derivative case 
of children and simple people) then that certainty could not be as firm or strong, 
reasonably, as religious believers claim that it is or should be. 7 
So, it seems, the certainty with which one accepts the fact of revelation can 
be based neither on knowledge nor on belief (aside from the derivative belief of 
children and simple people). But then it is hard to see how one's certainty could 
be rational at all. At best, it seems, one could have an opinion that revelation 
is a fact, but one could not be rationally certain of it. However, Christians often 
assert that divine faith includes "an assent that is firmer than all others."8 At the 
very least, one is encouraged to have great and strong faith. 9 How could this be 
so if the situation is as we described it? That is, the very idea of religious belief 
seems incoherent. 
It is true that there is no demonstration by speculative or theoretical reason 
which gives absolute certainty for the proposition that God has in fact given a 
revelation. 10 I think the argument against this is conclusive." 
I think it is also true that the certainty of the acceptance of the fact of revelation 
cannot ?e based on testimony (although what one accepts in religious faith is 
precisely that God is speaking through these or those human mediators). Hence 
acceptance of the fact of revelation is not an instance of exactly the same sort 
of act as non-religious belief. However, it does not seem that knowledge and 
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belief, in the senses defined, are the only kinds of acts which reasonably give 
certainty. 
Rather, even outside religious belief there are cognitive acts which are rationally 
certain and yet neither knowledge nor belief. An example is given by William 
James in his famous article, "The Will to Believe." Suppose a man is mountain 
climbing, and has climbed to a dangerous spot from which he can escape only 
by jumping across a wide chasm. The evidence just on its own indicates that it 
is probable, but only probable, that he will make the jump (I am changing 
James's example slightly, for my purposes). But if he believes with certainty he 
can make it then his chances are greatly increased. 12 It seems to me that it would 
not be wrong for him to try to induce in himself the belief that he will make the 
jump. To choose to believe this, or to choose to try to believe it, does not seem 
irrational. Such an act does not seem to violate one's duty to seek tmth and 
avoid error. (If one's success in jumping were wildly improbable, then it might 
violate one's moral duty in regard to tmth; but on our supposition it is probable 
that he will succeed). 
It might be objected that such examples show, not that one ought sometimes 
choose to believe, but that one ought sometimes act as if one took a given 
proposition to be certainly tme. However, in the example of the man jumping 
across the chasm, it is precisely his belief that the proposition (that his jump 
will succeed) is tme that enables him to act as he does. In this case, and in 
others like it,13 it is impossible for the person simply to act "as if." He must 
really believe the proposition as a condition of his acting in the desired manner. 
This type of act is not an opinion, since in it one has certainty of the proposition 
involved. Nor is it a belief, in the sense in which we have used the term here, 
for one is not accepting the proposition on the basis of someone' s testimony. 
Rather, it is accepting with certainty a proposition for the sake of a good which 
the belief of that proposition, together with its tmth, if it turns out to be tme, 
will help or enable one to realize. Let us call such an act "reasonable conviction." 
Hence the argument that the acceptance of the fact of revelation cannot be 
certain since it cannot be based (ultimately) on knowledge or belief presupposes 
an incomplete disjunction. Even in non-religious areas there is a type of cognitive 
act which is rational, certain, and yet neither knowledge nor belief (in the senses 
we have used the terms here). Acceptance of the fact of revelation is in some 
respects more analogous to the type of cognitive act we have called "reasonable 
conviction." In religious belief one accepts the fact of revelation at least partly 
for the sake of the good(s) which the belief together with its tmth will help one 
realize. 
In other words, the famous dilemma regarding one's certainty of the fact of 
revelation shows only that the word "belief' means different (though related) 
things when said of religious and non-religious belief. That is, "belief' is said 
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only analogically of the two kinds of act. This situation should not be surprising, 
given that religious believers typically claim that religious faith is in many 
respects sui generis. 14 
It should also be noted that in most non-religious belief, although it is obvious 
that the witness is testifying to some claim, and so one cannot have the kind of 
doubt one can have concerning religious belief, nevertheless it is not obvious 
that the witness is veracious. But the veracity of the witness, one might argue, 
can be neither known nor accepted on the basis of testimony. So, a puzzle 
analogous to that raised concerning religious belief could be raised concerning 
non-religious belief. Whether it be about the witness's veracity or about the fact 
that he is testifying, in every belief it seems that a decision must be made. Hence 
if this objection against religious belief were effective, it would prove too much. 
It would prove all belief, not just religious belief, irrational. In both cases, 
however, it seems that one can have an adequate reason to accept that which is 
not fully evident. 
iii. The Evidentialist Objection 
But doesn't the account just given presuppose that it is permissible to allow 
considerations other than evidence to influence one's act of believing? And isn't 
this, some object, precisely what irrationality is? Doesn't religious belief involve 
having more certainty in a proposition than what its evidence warrants? Doesn't 
it involve going beyond the evidence? This objection to religious belief is some-
times called "rationalism," and of late, the "evidentialist objection to religious 
belief. " 
Sometimes evidentialism is expressed in this way: it is wrong to believe 
anything upon insufficient evidence. 15 Another way of expressing the position 
is this: one ought to proportion one's belief in a proposition to the degree of 
evidence which one has to support that proposition. Or, one ought not go beyond 
the evidence in one's acts of believing. 16 
These ways of expressing it come down to the same thing, for what is meant 
is that, evidence alone should be determinative of what and how one believes. 
That is, nothing else should affect one's acts of believing except the relationship 
between the proposition believed and the evidence one knows that supports it. 
This is why this position is appropriately called "evidentialism." 
It seems that religious belief, or at any rate, Christian belief, violates the norm 
proposed by the evidentialist position. Hence if evidentialism were right, then 
one could know, a priori, that religious belief, or at any rate Christian belief, 
is objectively irrational; i.e., one could know this prior to examination of any 
particular claims made by Christianity. For either the evidence is sufficient or 
it is not. If it is sufficient then Christian belief is incoherent since it calls "belief' 
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or "faith" what is actually knowledge. If the evidence is not sufficient then it is 
incoherent, since it asks one to accept something with more certainty then it is 
reasonable for one to do. So if evidentialism were true one would know that the 
very idea of Christian belief is incoherent. 
Anthony Kenny succinctly states the evidentialist objection, as applied to 
Christianity, as follows: 
No doubt it may be reasonably believed that Moses and Jesus did 
and said many of the things ascribed to them in the Bible; but can it 
reasonably be believed with a degree of certainty resembling that of 
knowledge? Unless the relevant stories can be as certain as the commit-
ment which faith demands of the believer, the commitment is, so far 
forth as it is faith, irrational; and if the belief is a commitment which 
is rationally in proportion to the support given by the history, it is, so 
far forth as it is rational, something less than faith. 17 
Certainly, religious belief by Christians violates the norm proposed by eviden-
tialism. In Christian belief one is absolutely certain of propositions alleged to 
be revealed, but, since it is belief and not knowledge, one has less than demonstra-
tive evidence for the proposition. Nevertheless, what is the evidence for eviden-
tialism? Why make evidence alone determinative of the degree with which one 
will assent to a proposition? Why can't a hope for the realization of a basic good 
(together with a degree of evidence) justify a choice to believe, provided that 
in such a choice truth is not negated or disregarded? 
Of course, what is really behind the evidentialist position is the conviction 
that going beyond the evidence, letting something besides evidence intluence 
one's acts of believing, constitutes in itself a negation or a disregarding of truth. 
But what reason, what evidence is there, for such a position?18 
I have described the act of "reasonable conviction" as an act of accepting a 
proposition for the sake of a good which the belief, together with the truth of 
the proposition, will help one realize. If the belief alone were sufficient to bring 
about the good one is seeking by believing, then it seems that the action would 
involve disregarding truth, and therefore would be immoral. 19 An example of 
this is: believing in astrology because it makes one feel good, or even, believing 
in God solely because such a belief makes one more moral. If the belief by 
itself-independently of the belief's truth-were sufficient to bring about the 
good one hoped for, then one's choice to believe would include a willingness 
or consent to believe falsely. This would violate the basic good of possession 
of truth. 
However, what we have called reasonable conviction does not include a consent 
to believe falsely. And, since religious belief either is a type of reasonable 
conviction or is analogous (in the relevant respects) to it, it does not include a 
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consent to believe falsely either. In sum: (1) religious belief can be motivated 
by a hope for the realization of a basic human good; (2) religious belief need 
not include a negative attitude toward or a disregarding of any other basic human 
good. From these points it follows that religious belief could be, in the appropriate 
conditions, a morally good act. More formally: 
Every immoral act violates (i.e., negates, disregards, or so on) a basic 
human good. 
Possibly, some acts of religious belief do not violate a basic human good. 
Therefore, possibly, some acts of religious belief are not immoral. 
The ethics of belief is in some respects analogous to the ethics of sex, though 
of course there are also important differences. One might argue that the sexual 
power is naturally oriented to the procreative good, while the cognitive power 
is naturally oriented to the possession of truth. But just as it does not follow that 
the sexual power must be used only for procreation (no one argues this) so also 
it does not follow that one's cognitive acts, one's acts of believing, must be 
influenced only by the goal of truth. What follows is that all of the basic goods 
that could be affected by the action carrying out one's choice must be respected. 
Just as one ought not to negate the procreative good, so one ought not to negate 
the good of possession of truth. 
But just as the choice to engage in sex for the sake of expressing marital 
communion is morally good if it is a choice that does not disregard the procreative 
good; so the choice to believe for the sake of a basic good which the belief, 
together with the truth of the belief, will help one realize, can in some instances 
be morally good, i.e., in those instances where truth is not disregarded. In neither 
case is there a choice to impede or destroy a basic good; in neither case need 
one disregard a basic good. The two cases are similar in the relevant respects. 
Hence if it can be morally permissible to engage in sex for a good other than 
procreation, then it can also be morally permissible for one's act of believing 
to be influenced (in this case, be more certain) by a hope for the good of personal 
communion. 20 
Moreover, it seems that friendship, any friendship, is a good that can be 
realized only by going beyond the evidence. One does not have to be a dualist 
to see that crucial aspects of the person, such as a person's commitments, are 
not directly seen or experienced by other persons. And yet it is especially with 
these aspects of the person that one unites oneself in a friendship. In a friendship 
each friend not only cares for the other for the other's sake, but also in some 
way chooses, freely accepts, the friendship, i.e., the relationship, itself. This 
could not be so unless each friend accepted the other's (explicit or implicit) 
claim to be a friend, the other's claim to care for that friend. But this caring, 
this resolve to be a friend, is an aspect of the other person that cannot be directly 
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seen or experienced. In other words, reaching out to central aspects of another 
self, in friendship, requires one to go beyond the evidence, for the simple reason 
that central aspects of the self are beyond the evidence. One must be willing to 
accept, without proof, that the other is sincere in his or her offer or claim of 
friendship. 
If this is true, then belief is not a necessary means toward friendship, but a 
part of it. Friendship is impossible without belief, without accepting something 
upon insufficient evidence, without an assent not proportioned to the evidence. 
Now, friendship is a morally good thing. Therefore belief, going beyond the 
evidence, which is part of it, must also be morally permissible. Or, to state the 
argument differently, if the evidentialist objection against religious belief were 
effective, it would also show that friendship is immoral, which, I think, we can 
take to be a reductio ad absurdum. 
To sum up this section. Granted, the evidence is not sufficient to warrant the 
degree of certainty characteristic of religious belief; on this point Kenny and 
others are correct. But they assume that only evidence can rationally justify 
certainty. And what I have argued is that concern for a good which the belief 
plus the belief's truth would help one realize can supplement evidence in order 
to rationally justify certainty. 
iv. The Good Which Motivates the Choice of Religious 
Belief and the Appropriateness of Certainty 
It remains to illustrate what good might rationally motivate the choice of 
religious belief. For comparison let us look at another instance of non-religious 
belief, one more closely analogous to religious belief than the examples we have 
examined so far. Suppose George proposes marriage to Hilda. He tells Hilda 
that he loves her, proposes that they set up together a common life, and tells 
her of things he has done for her-that he has, for example, bought them a 
house for the home they will make if she says yes. So, Hilda has a choice. She 
can accept what George says as true and sincere and accept the proposal, or not. 
She cannot, obviously, prove that his proposal is sincere. Let us suppose George 
is not a villainous type, that there are signs that he is a good and honest person; 
in other words, one would likely say his claim is "credible," worthy to be believed. 
Well, might there not be a good reason for Hilda to choose to believe and 
accept George's proposal? And, doesn't it seem that if she accepts the proposal 
there is good reason for accepting it with certainty? Accepting it with certainty, 
without doubts, seems to be part of the commitment one must make in order to 
enter into such a personal relationship. If she held that the proposal were probably 
sincere, that accepting it is merely a good bet, her attitude would seem more 
appropriate to a business transaction, that is, to a merely contractual union. It 
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would not be appropriate to the kind of personal communion which should 
flourish in a marriage. So, because it is a personal relationship that is involved, 
if Hilda accepts, then it seems reasonable to say that she ought to accept with 
certainty. Hilda's choice to accept the proposal would be for the sake of the 
personal communion offered in the proposal. And because the acceptance begins 
a personal communion, certainty is appropriate. 
This type of situation is analogous with religious belief in many respects. 
Christians claim that God proposes to set up a common life with those who 
accept his proposal. Hence according to Christians revelation is not merely 
impersonal information or a set of speculative truths. It is a personal communi-
cation. It reveals, in part, who God is, his invitation and commitment to personal 
communion, and many of the things he has done for US. 21 
SO, as with the marriage situation, it seems that one might reasonably choose 
to accept God's proposal for the sake of the personal communion offered. 
Moreover, as with the marriage situation, if one accepts the proposal there seems 
to be a good reason to accept it with certainty. 
v. How Reasons Might Function In Religious Belief 
But if all this is true then what need is there for reasons at all? Do people 
need reasons for their religious belief to be rational? Are there not many quite 
rational beliefs in the absence of reasons? Moreover, what role, precisely, could 
reasons play in the act of belief, if they are needed? Would not basing one's 
belief on reasons make it unstable, just the opposite of what believers want to 
say religious belief ought to be?22 
It is important to distinguish the following questions: (a) Does everyone need 
evidence, i.e., arguments, to support their conviction that God has given a 
revelation? (b) Do some people need arguments to support their religious belief? 
To answer (a) would require us to settle some large issues in the theory of 
knowledgeY But for most practical issues, as far as I can see, there is no need 
to answer this question. So, whether every religious believer needs reasons or 
not, we shall not investigate. It does seem, however, that some people need 
reasons or arguments if their religious belief is to be rational. Specifically, people 
who stop and ask themselves whether they should accept religious belief, or this 
or that religious belief, need reasons if their belief is to be rational. 
If one explicitly asks oneself whether one should believe, or whether one's 
belief is a good thing, then, in order to be rational, one must consider the 
circumstances or conditions that might make that belief rational. And the consid-
eration of such justifying circumstances or conditions is reasoning. The reason 
why one must, in that situation, consider the justifying conditions of the belief 
is this: when one asks which of two (or more) alternatives one ought to do, both 
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of which seem to be at least indirectly within one's power, then, for the choice 
to be morally good, one must be sure that one is not slighting or disregarding 
any of the goods affected by one's choice. Now, possession of truth is one of 
the goods affected by one's choice to believe. And so when one chooses to 
believe something one must consider conditions or circumstances which pertain 
to the likelihood of one's belief being true. 
Someone might object that while this argument may prove that some people 
must reason, it does not show that they must have reasons. Considering alterna-
tives is not the same as having reasons for one alternative over the other. As 
the argument stands this objection would be correct, or, put otherwise, in the 
abstract the argument of the last paragraph shows only that some people must 
reason not that they must arrive at reasons. However, concretely, the religion I 
am interested in is Christianity, which is an historical and quite reasonable 
religion. So, if one does reason about Christianity, I presume one will have 
reasons also. 
Hence the function reasons serve is, not to prove the theoretical proposition 
stating the fact that God has revealed, but (at least) to make it clear to oneself 
that one's choice to believe is a morally responsible choice. 24 
However, it is at least misleading to say that one's belief is based on the 
reasons one has in its favor. Acceptance of revelation is not simply the conclusion 
of an argument. That is, to say that the belief was based on arguments would 
imply the arguments were the sale foundation, a sufficient condition accounting 
for one's belief and the manner in which one holds it. These implications are 
simply not true, as we have seen above, and so in the normal sense of the word, 
"basis," the arguments are not the basis of the belief.25 Rather, they are conditions 
for the moral goodness of one's choice to believe. 
The fact that reasons have such a role does not make one's belief unstable 
and subject to doubt. It would do so only if one followed the evidentialist 
prescription and proportioned one's belief to those reasons, i.e., to the evidence 
(and so, to see how one should believe today one would have to tally the evidence 
at hand today). But we have already rejected the evidentialist prescription. 
When speaking of the role of reasons in belief we should note that people 
often reason without being able to articulate their reasoning processes. This 
happens especially regarding personal or complex topics. For example, one may 
recognize a friend, and have gone through a reasoning process to recognize him, 
and yet be unable to articulate the reasoning one did. Similarly, a person may 
in fact perceive or be aware that the Gospel and the Church have various signs 
of divine origin, but be unable to articulate the arguments one goes through, 
implicitly, to reach one's certainty that God is speaking through them. 26 This is 
another reason why evidentialism is not a reasonable norm by which to regulate 
one's acts of belief. Very often one has more evidence than one can articulate 
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or tally. Hence in practice it is often impossible to know how to proportion one's 
belief to the evidence one actually possesses. 
How reasons might enter into religious belief, may be further illustrated if we 
consider another example. Suppose that a young man has just been in a serious 
motorcycle accident and almost killed. He is lying in the hospital bed with his 
head bandaged so that he can only see dimly and hear vaguely. Suppose also 
that the hospital authorities have informed him that his treatment will be discon-
tinued unless he proves himself able to pay the bill, and he cannot do that. 
Further, the boy was estranged from his family a few years back; he left home, 
say, after a heated argument with his parents. While he is lying in the hospital 
bed a man comes into his room, claims to be his brother, and claims to have a 
message from their father, that the father is in town and would like to visit the 
boy and receive the boy back into the family. 
Since the boy cannot see or hear well, it is not immediately evident that the 
person speaking to him really is who he says he is. Maybe, it occurs to him, 
the man is really a doctor trying to make him feel good before he dies. So, it 
seems that the boy has a choice; he can believe the claim or not. 
How could the boy go about making up his mind whether to accept the claim? 
Perhaps he would listen to the alleged brother very carefully. Perhaps he would 
investigate both the alleged brother and what he says, to determine as well as 
he could whether he acts like his brother would act, whether he does and says 
just the kinds of things his brother would say and do. Similarly, people looking 
into the Christian claim should look at Jesus, his deeds, and his teaching to see 
whether Jesus does indeed act like a messenger from God, and whether he does 
and says the things that only a messenger of God would and could do. 
The boy might scrutinize the alleged brother's message to see if it is the sort 
of message his father would give, whether, perhaps, it reveals things only his 
father would know, whether, that is, it has the marks or signs of really being a 
message from his father. Likewise, people can investigate Christian teaching 
and ask whether it has signs of having a divine origin. 
In replying to evidentialism, I have argued above that the idea of religious 
belief is not incoherent. That is, I tried to show that it would be reasonable to 
accept a belief with more certainty than the evidence by itself warrants. Such a 
choice could be reasonable, I argued, provided there is some degree of evidence 
and provided that one chooses to be certain, or to believe, for the sake of the 
truth and the personal communion offered, which are basic goods one can begin 
to realize by believing, if the belief is true. This example of the boy in the 
hospital, however, suggests that there can be situations where, while the evidence 
is not sufficient to compel one to give assent, nevertheless, the evidence, together 
with the whole situation, are such that one morally ought to accept a particular 
belief. 
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To see this, consider the following. Suppose that in the boy's case the evidence 
is not sufficient to compel the boy's assent. He cannot, in other words, have 
knowledge (in the sense in which we have used the word here) that this is his 
brother and that this is a message from his father. But at some point it seems 
there could be enough evidence so that the boy ought to accept the claim. The 
boy ought not to demand absolute proof before he accepts the claim made by 
the (alleged) brother. Were he to do so, this would indicate an ungracious or 
impious attitude toward his father, and an unwise disregard for his own health. 
Similarly, at some point the evidence for the Christian claim might be sufficient, 
not to compel assent, but to make it such that one not only may, but morally 
ought, to accept the proposal as true. Just as in the boy's situation, so here, to 
demand absolute proof, to demand proof that would be proportionate to the 
assent asked of one, would be to lack the virtues of gratitude and piety (as well 
as a prudent regard for one's ultimate welfare). And so reasons might function, 
not to show with absolute certainty the theoretical proposition that the claim is 
a fact, but to show the moral proposition that I ought to believe. There are many 
situations in which one ought to believe: a child ought to believe his or her 
parents, a scientist ought to believe most of his colleagues when they report 
experimental findings, a wife (generally) ought to believe her husband. The 
situations where reasons might function in this way are, roughly, those in which 
to demand absolute proof, or even to demand more evidence than one possesses, 
as a pre-requisite to believing, would show a disregard for the basic goods one 
might realize by the belief together with the truth of the belief. 
Christians claim that they bear or transmit a personal communication from 
God, that is, a proposal from him of personal communion and an invitation to 
participate in building up a community of divine and human persons (called "the 
Kingdom"). In several respects, then, we are in a situation analogous to that of 
the boy in the hospital. 27 Whether the reasons in behalf of Christianity are 
sufficient to show that one ought to believe is a question that would require 
looking into historical and other types of evidence outside the philosophical 
realm to answer. But I have tried to show here that the idea that such might be 
the case is not incoherent in itself. 28 
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I. St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, Part II-II, Question 1. article 4. A contemporary 
exposition that contrasts knowledge and belief as I have done: Bernard Lonergan, S.L Insight, A 
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Study of Human Understanding, 3rd ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1970), pp. 703-13. 
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is indicated so far. This is true of religious belief also, since it is the basis of the personal relationship 
between the believer and God. When a woman accepts a marriage proposal, she does more than 
accept certain propositions as true. She accepts the person making the proposal, for what he proposes 
is a common life; and she commits herself to do her part in the new relationship she is entering. 
Religious belief is analogous to acceptance of a marriage proposal, since revelation is God's proposal 
to set up a common life with us, and so it also includes more than accepting the truth of certain 
propositions. However. while it includes more, nevertheless, accepting propositions as true is essen-
tially involved in it. It would be nonsense if a woman claimed to believe her husband but not to 
believe him when he says he loves her and that he has done certain things for her. Likewise, it is 
incorrect to say one can believe God without accepting the truth of any propositions. 
3. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Pt. II-II. q. 2, a. I. 
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metzer, #3008. An English translation can be found in: The Church Teaches. Documents of the 
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(Rockford, Illinois: Tan Books and Publishers, 1973), p. 29. 
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IfI. De Gratia Christi-De Virtutibus Theologicis. De Sacramentis in genere. Baptismo et Confir-
matione (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1946), pp. 348-54. A very thorough treatment, including a 
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of their parents, priest, minister, rabbi, or so on, is derivative in a special sense. It is derivative not 
just in the sense that it relies on someone else's knowledge but in that it relies on the belief of other 
people. This is not in any way to detract from the virtuousness of such faith. It is simply to say that 
if such belief is to be objectively rational, it must derive from someone else's rational belief. 
7. Why, someone may object, do the prophets in the Old Testament repeat such things as. "This 
is the very word of the Lord," or, 'Thus says the Lord"? (For example. see Jeremiah. ch. 7; Ezekiel, 
ch. 7) First, someone must say, or it must somehow be indicated, when it is that the prophet begins 
to speak not in his own name but in God's. That is, whether God is speaking through this person 
is a distinct question from when he begins to speak. And I am inclined to think that such utterances 
as just mentioned address the second question rather than the first. 
But, secondly, I do not wish to say that the acceptance of the fact of revelation is in no way or 
degree based on human testimony. There is a sense in which the believer believes both God and 
the prophet. But my point in the text is that this dependence on human testimony is either not 
ultimate or, at least, fails to account for the certainty involved in the believer's acceptance of the 
fact of revelation. 
8. E.g., SI. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Pt. II-II, q. 4. a. 8, especially replies to objections 2 
and 3. Cf. Herve, op. cit., p. 353. 
9. E.g., St. Paul's First Letter to the Thessalonians, 3: 10; Romans, 14; 2 Corinthians, 10: 15. 
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University of Notre Dame, 1983). p. 16 f.. 
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Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979),225-32. 
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on testimony. Rather, if one insists on treating the acceptance of the fact of revelation separately. 
and so in that case it would not be based on testimony, then it still does not follow that faith is 
irrational. What would follow is only that it is of a different sort of act than of the sort one is willing 
to call "belief." 
15. "But if the belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence, the pleasure is a stolen one. Not 
only does it deceive ourselves by giving us a sense of power which we do not really possess, but 
it is sinful, because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves 
from such beliefs as from a pestilence, which may shortly master our body and spread to the rest 
of the town." 
And: "To sum up: It is wrong always, everywhere. and for anyone to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence." W. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief." reprinted in: E. D. Klemke. A. 
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p. 49. 50. 
CL Bertrand Russell, "Why I am not a Christian," in Why 1 Am Not a Christian (New York: 
Simon & Schuster. 1957), p. 3 ff. Anthony Flew. The Presumption of Atheism (London: Pemberton, 
1976), p. 22 ff. Cited by Plantinga. op. cit., p. 91. 
16. "There is such a thing as a general ethics of the intellect. The main principle of that ethic I hold 
to be the same inside and outside religion. This principle is simple and sweeping: Equate your assent 
to the evidence." Brand Blanshard, Reason and Belief (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974), p. 401. 
Cf. John Locke, An Essav Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV. ch. XVI. 
17. Anthony Kenny, Faith and Reason (New York: Columbia University, 1983), p. 83. 
18. Both evidentialism and our account presuppose that one does, in some way, have voluntary 
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sense to speak of choosing to believe, that belief. rather, is something that happens to one in the 
face of evidence. 
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can choose to believe in the sense of choosing to refrain from further doubts. 
19. For a defense and development-philosophical, even though in the context of a theology work---of 
some of the ethical points presupposed here: Germain Grisez. The Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 
/, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press. 1983), Chapters 5, 7 and 8. Also 
see: Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame. 1979). pp. 358-71. 
20. In the case of belief it seems that a regard for truth requires also that there be some degree of 
evidence, that the proposition not be wildly improbable. 
21. See Germain Grisez. The Way of the Lord Jesus, op. cit., Chapter 20. 
22. Cf. Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," op. cit. 
23. Plantinga, op. cit., argues that the position that everyone needs reasons or arguments for his or 
her belief to be rational rests on classical foundationalism. Classical foundationalism is the claim 
that unless a belief is self-evident. evident to the senses. or incorrigible, one must have evidence 
for it for one's acceptance of it to be rational. He then argues that this claim does not pass its own 
test, that it is self-referentially inconsistent. 
To settle this issue, then, would require delving into the deep waters of the controversy surrounding 
epistemological foundationalism, and its various sUb-species. 
24. This position was argued bX Guy De Broglie, S.J., Revelation and Reason, trans. by Mark 
Pontifex, O.S.B. (New York: Hawthorn, 1965), pp. 1-66. 
25. This claim is not new. It was universally agreed to by the classical scholastic theologians who 
discussed the problem concerning the analysis of the act of faith. 
26. Cf. John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (New York: Doubleday, 
Image, 1955). especially pp. 270-300, in the chapter on what Newman called "the illative sense." 
27. I have not examined here the role of divine grace. As a Christian I believe that "No one can 
come to [Jesus] unless it is granted him by the Father." (John, 6, 66). How grace and nature interact 
in the act of belief is another question. But I suppose here that this act is a human act, even though 
it is transformed by grace, and my chief concern in this article has been to show that, and to a 
certain extent, how, this act need not violate any human values. 
28. I am grateful to Joseph M. Boyle and William P. Alston, the editor, for critical comments on 
earlier versions of this article. 
